descartes’ reason discourse(笛卡尔的推理)-第16章
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worthless； yet it is likewise true that our cares ought to extend beyond the
present； and it is good to omit doing what might perhaps bring some profit
to the living； when we have in view the acplishment of other ends that
will be of much greater advantage to posterity。 And in truth； I am quite
willing it should be known that the little I have hitherto learned is almost
nothing in parison with that of which I am ignorant； and to the
knowledge of which I do not despair of being able to attain； for it is much
the same with those who gradually discover truth in the sciences； as with
those who when growing rich find less difficulty in making great
acquisitions； than they formerly experienced when poor in making
acquisitions of much smaller amount。 Or they may be pared to the
manders of armies； whose forces usually increase in proportion to
their victories； and who need greater prudence to keep together the residue
of their troops after a defeat than after a victory to take towns and
provinces。 For he truly engages in battle who endeavors to surmount all
the difficulties and errors which prevent him from reaching the knowledge
of truth； and he is overe in fight who admits a false opinion touching a
matter of any generality and importance； and he requires thereafter much
more skill to recover his former position than to make great advances
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DISCOURSE ON THE METHOD OF RIGHTLY CONDUCTING THE REASON； AND
SEEKING TRUTH IN THE SCIENCES
when once in possession of thoroughly ascertained principles。 As for
myself； if I have succeeded in discovering any truths in the sciences （and I
trust that what is contained in this volume 1 will show that I have found
some）； I can declare that they are but the consequences and results of five
or six principal difficulties which I have surmounted； and my encounters
with which I reckoned as battles in which victory declared for me。 I will
not hesitate even to avow my belief that nothing further is wanting to
enable me fully to realize my designs than to gain two or three similar
victories； and that I am not so far advanced in years but that； according to
the ordinary course of nature； I may still have sufficient leisure for this end。
But I conceive myself the more bound to husband the time that remains
the greater my expectation of being able to employ it aright； and I should
doubtless have much to rob me of it； were I to publish the principles of my
physics： for although they are almost all so evident that to assent to them
no more is needed than simply to understand them； and although there is
not one of them of which I do not expect to be able to give demonstration；
yet； as it is impossible that they can be in accordance with all the diverse
opinions of others； I foresee that I should frequently be turned aside from
my grand design； on occasion of the opposition which they would be sure
to awaken。
It may be said； that these oppositions would be useful both in making
me aware of my errors； and； if my speculations contain anything of value；
in bringing others to a fuller understanding of it； and still farther； as many
can see better than one； in leading others who are now beginning to avail
themselves of my principles； to assist me in turn with their discoveries。
But though I recognize my extreme liability to error； and scarce ever trust
to the first thoughts which occur to me； yet…the experience I have had of
possible objections to my views prevents me from anticipating any profit
from them。 For I have already had frequent proof of the judgments； as
well of those I esteemed friends； as of some others to whom I thought I
was an object of indifference； and even of some whose malignancy and
envy would； I knew； determine them to endeavor to discover what
partiality concealed from the eyes of my friends。 But it has rarely
happened that anything has been objected to me which I had myself
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DISCOURSE ON THE METHOD OF RIGHTLY CONDUCTING THE REASON； AND
SEEKING TRUTH IN THE SCIENCES
altogether overlooked； unless it were something far removed from the
subject： so that I have never met with a single critic of my opinions who
did not appear to me either less rigorous or less equitable than myself。 And
further； I have never observed that any truth before unknown has been
brought to light by the disputations that are practised in the schools； for
while each strives for the victory； each is much more occupied in making
the best of mere verisimilitude； than in weighing the reasons on both sides
of the question； and those who have been long good advocates are not
afterwards on that account the better judges。
As for the advantage that others would derive from the munication
of my thoughts； it could not be very great； because I have not yet so far
prosecuted them as that much does not remain to be added before they can
be applied to practice。 And I think I may say without vanity； that if there
is any one who can carry them out that length； it must be myself rather
than another： not that there may not be in the world many minds
inparably superior to mine； but because one cannot so well seize a
thing and make it one's own； when it has been learned from another； as
when one has himself discovered it。 And so true is this of the present
subject that； though I have often explained some of my opinions to
persons of much acuteness； who； whilst I was speaking； appeared to
understand them very distinctly； yet； when they repeated them； I have
observed that they almost always changed them to such an extent that I
could no longer acknowledge them as mine。 I am glad； by the way； to
take this opportunity of requesting posterity never to believe on hearsay
that anything has proceeded from me which has not been published by
myself； and I am not at all astonished at the extravagances attributed to
those ancient philosophers whose own writings we do not possess； whose
thoughts； however； I do not on that account suppose to have been really
absurd； seeing they were among the ablest men of their times； but only
that these have been falsely represented to us。 It is observable；
accordingly； that scarcely in a single instance has any one of their disciples
surpassed them； and I am quite sure that the most devoted of the present
followers of Aristotle would think themselves happy if they had as much
knowledge of nature as he possessed； were it even under the condition that
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DISCOURSE ON THE METHOD OF RIGHTLY CONDUCTING THE REASON； AND
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they should never afterwards attain to higher。 In this respect they are like
the ivy which never strives to rise above the tree that sustains it； and which
frequently even returns downwards when it has reached the top； for it
seems to me that they also sink； in other words； render themselves less
wise than they would be if they gave up study； who； not contented with
knowing all that is intelligibly explained in their author； desire in addition
to find in him the solution of many difficulties of which he says not a
word； and never perhaps so much as thought。 Their fashion of
philosophizing； however； is well suited to persons whose abilities fall
below mediocrity； for the obscurity of the distinctions and principles of
which they make use enables them to speak of all things with as much
confidence as if they really knew them； and to defend all that they say on
any subject against the most subtle and skillful； without its being possible
for any one to convict them of error。 In this they seem to me to be like a
blind man； who； in
